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Cornelius Castoriadis was a leftist. Throughout his life he identified with left-wing 
causes. He began youthful political life as a Communist-turned-Trotskyist. In exile in France he 
moved to a kind of independent leftism that began with a trenchant critique of Jean-Paul 
Sartre's apologetics for Communism and mutated into a vision of a non-bureaucratic self-
managed society. For a time Castoriadis thought of the benchmark society as ‘socialism’ but he 
eventually stopped using that term and opted to talk instead about an ‘autonomous society’. It 
was never entirely clear what Castoriadis meant by autonomy. He didn’t quite mean the 
autonomous individual of John Stuart Mill’s liberal society. His concept of autonomy referred 
more to a society than an individual. An autonomous society was one capable of self-critique. It 
contained individuals who were capable of criticizing the society they were members of. An 
autonomous society was one that could re-invent itself in a deep-going way with new laws and 
practices.  
That was very much the left-wing Castoriadis. But there is another Castoriadis, one who 
is less obvious but also less obviously a left-winger. There are several threads in Castoriadis’ 
thought that have a right-wing resonance. For one thing, Castoriadis thought of autonomy not 
only in terms of critique, which is a left-wing platitude, but also in terms of creation which has 
much wider and more interesting significance. Since Schumpeter, many conservatives have 
strongly identified with capitalism’s process of creative destruction.1 Furthermore Castoriadis 
identified the well-spring of creativity with the West, hardly a standard left-wing nostrum. He 
thought (correctly) that autonomous societies were a function of the Greco-Western tradition. 
He understood very clearly that the larger part of high-level human creation, not least the arts 
and sciences, were produced by a relative small band of Western societies. He attributed that 




questioned the laws of society (as well as the laws of science and the laws of art) but who also 
possessed a love of creation—an eros of making, innovating, and bringing-into-being.  
Contra-wise, Castoriadis was no fan of Third World politics.2 While anti-colonial third-
world-ism became popular in the 1960s and 1970s, Castoriadis kept a skeptical distance from it. 
This was a movement that he knew could only end in tears. He was not wrong.  Castoriadis was 
also a defender of the institution of the family.3 He expressed a deeply skeptical view of 
feminism.4 Finally there is the testy matter of capitalism. In some ways Castoriadis was a 
conventional leftist. This was true of his view of capitalism: capitalism is bad. He started out 
with the view that capitalism is bad because it generates alienation. Later he thought it was bad 
because it lacked an internal limit. Capitalist economies grow. Economic growth is the most 
powerfully legitimating force of capitalist societies. Growth equals prosperity equals legitimacy. 
What is not to like about that? In the past two hundred years, capitalism has improved the 
living standard of many societies 15-20 times over. It has lifted five out of the six billion of the 
world’s population out of a fate that previously had caused almost everyone to live on $2 a day 
or less. Most twentieth-century intellectuals ignored the power of that achievement. 
Castoriadis did too. He took the view that growth lacked limits. Whatever lacks a limit, a peras, 
will end in grief. Growth is a kind of ancient Greek tragedy. It is hubris de-personified. The 
person with hubris knows not when to stop. That was the lesson of ancient drama. Christianity 
made roughly the same point. Pride was the cause of human downfall. Those who are proud do 
not see what is in front of them. Pride blinds and terrible mistakes follow. The same, Castoriadis 
reasoned, applied to society. 
Capitalism is often equated with greed. Greed is a variation on the flaw of hubris and 
the sin of pride. The greedy person doesn’t know when to stop eating or accumulating money. 
There is never enough. Castoriadis’ view of capitalism as an economic system without an 
internal limit suggested it was an impersonal version of greed. Capitalism’s excess would lead to 
its own extinction. But the caricature of capitalism as the plaything of fat cats and bloated 
plutocrats has never been convincing. In fact it is not true that capitalism lacks an internal limit. 
Conventional leftism, represented by Karl Marx, supposed that capitalism expanded until it fell 




Marx. For a decade Castoriadis worked as a professional economist in the OECD in Paris. At the 
same time, he produced an extensive critique of Marx’s economics. Critique is probably the 
right word. For although Castoriadis criticized Marx, he also carried over certain assumptions 
from Marx, principally that growth was a linear (progressive or regressive) phenomenon. Things 
grew larger, problems accumulated, capitalism experienced crisis. The history of both the 
nineteenth and twentieth century suggested this was in part true but that capitalism was in fact 
not linear but cyclical. One of the three greatest economists of the twentieth century, Joseph 
Schumpeter, made cycles central to his economics.5 Cyclical analysis supposes that capitalism 
expands and contracts and expands and contracts and expands and so on. As such, it has limits 
built into it. In this respect, it functions a bit like a diaphragm. It expands and reaches a limit 
and contracts and reaches a limit and expands and reaches a limit and so on.  
It was not only nineteenth-century liberals who were captivated by the Enlightenment 
idea of progress; so were most socialists. Yet despite the entrenchment of the notion of 
progress, much about modern societies does not move in straight lines but rather in loops. The 
ring, the circle, the old-fashioned revolving revolution, the cyclical rotation—all of these notions 
better describe certain aspects of modern capitalist societies than does the idea that society or 
its sub-systems are linear, additive or cumulative in whatever direction one might imagine, be it 
forwards, backwards, up or down. In an economic cycle, what is going down is already latently 
preparing for the path upwards. That is not to say that in a modern society there are no long-
term linear phenomena to be observed. Over two hundred plus years of modern industrial 
capitalism, successful capitalist societies have over the long course trended upwards in real 
wealth per capita. Yet that broadly linear development has been ironically progressed by 
cyclical mechanisms, one of whose functions is to destroy outmoded types of wealth and 
wealth creation. The modern dynamic loop or cycle is in fact also a spiral. Creative destruction 
is the internal limit of creative expansion. Yet it is also the condition of the possibility of further, 
greater and better creation. Each step forward thus requires a partial step back. Each looping, 
spiraling partial step backwards is also a trigger for a spiraling loop whose down-slope is 
simultaneously an up-slope. Figuratively speaking, the modern capitalist imaginary is an Escher-




direction. Or rather you are going in both directions at the same time. Naturally this makes 
economic forecasting, among other things, difficult.  
The ambidextrous logic of capitalism means though that Castoriadis was right to 
question modern rationalism even if he was wrong to suggest that modern capitalism was a 
function of modern rationalism and that the periodic crises of capitalism betrayed the pseudo-
rationality of modern reason. He had two criticisms of rationalism. One, the most important, 
was that you cannot explain the imagination—and thus all forms of human invention—on the 
basis of reason alone. This is true. Castoriadis developed this proposition in his earliest writings 
from the 1940s, in his commentary on Max Weber. Like most intellectuals of the time, 
Castoriadis spent a lot of time commenting on Karl Marx in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet his more 
important if often implicit interlocutor was Weber. He rightly intuited that Weber was a much 
more significant thinker than Marx. Castoriadis took issue with Weber’s view from the early 
20th century that the success of modern societies could be explained by the process of 
rationalization. Reason applied to social processes made them more functional and thus more 
productive. Castoriadis countered that each society has its form of reason that is posited by 
that society’s collective imagination. Thus the imagination of a certain kind of modern society 
had discovered how to rationalize. This type of society was capitalist and imbued with a work 
ethic, most commonly a Protestant work ethic. Off-shoots from such societies spun outwards 
from North-western Europe after the era of the Renaissance. The rationalizing form of reason, 
which was demonstrably a modern form of reason, had powerful social applications in 
industries, markets and more generally in modern institutions. Castoriadis insisted though that 
rationalization also had its negatives. 
The first of these negatives was that the reason of rationalization obscured the function 
of the collective imagination. This was part of a larger criticism that Castoriadis repeated many 
times: namely that most societies, both modern and traditional, occluded imagination in favor 
some kind of social power, be it ritual or reason that drugged the imagination and put it to 
sleep. In a way Castoriadis was right. The driving force of modern industrial capitalist societies is 
the imagination. It produces very high levels of innovation and invention. The national income 




ago. There is no precedent for this in history. Life expectancy, housing, education, disposable 
income, transport and comfort levels have risen multiple times in these societies. To do this, 
these societies unleashed an avalanche of innovation. Moreover, and possibly more crucially, 
they set in train an expectation of perpetual innovation. Time and again they raised 
productivity and increased efficiency. Sometimes this was done by rationalization but the 
greatest developments happened by acts of imagination. They created new products and 
processes, new technologies and aesthetics. Castoriadis does not link creativity and productivity 
but he does foreground the act of creation. He does see it as socially central. He may disparage 
growth but he also theorizes its engine. He might not have Schumpeter’s sense of how much 
modern industrial capitalism relies on creation but even more than Schumpeter he locates 
creation at the heart of the modern social drama.   
The second of the negatives that Castoriadis raised concerning rationalization was more 
ambivalent. He suggested that modern societies equated reason with rationalization, 
rationalization with development, development with growth, and growth with numeric size. 
From that long chain, a tacit formula emerges that equates bigger with better and better with 
more.6 One has to be cautious with this second criticism. Sometimes it is true that more is not 
better. It perfectly correct, as Castoriadis argued, that more scientific publications or more 
people with PhDs is not ipso facto better. Yet, sometimes, more is better. If a population 
increases, then economic growth to produce more jobs to meet that population increase is 
better than not having economic growth. There is an irony lurking here. The Weberian ethic—
the Protestant ethic—assumed that less is more. By being more austere, by trimming waste, 
cutting slack, reducing expenditure, a company and an economy could grow. Austerity led to 
riches. Many left-wing critics of rationalization criticized riches in the name of an austere view 
of the world. They responded to Protestant asceticism with their own brand of asceticism. The 
Weberian capitalist was ascetic in order to paradoxically produce wealth, a non-ascetic 
condition. The radical anti-capitalist criticized wealth produced by development and growth on 
the basis that it offended their ascetic sensibility. Castoriadis was more nuanced this, though. 
There is a streak of left-wing asceticism in him, the negative theology of a Marx who denounced 




expansion is hubris.  It betrays a deluded human sense of omnipotence, of the human God-like 
ambition for infinity, infinite possibility, and unlimited acquisition. What makes human beings 
human is a sense of limits. We cannot grow something infinitely. An economic boom will not 
last forever. The growth of any company is not unlimited. The wealth of any individual will not 
expand forever. The richest person today will not be the richest person tomorrow. Our 
knowledge of anything does not progress infinitely. We cannot know everything about 
ourselves or others. The world around us is not completely transparent. Our society and our 
morals are not perfect. Human beings are not perfectible. We are not gods. Our society is not 
transcendent. Our domination of nature is not absolute.7 That means, as Castoriadis reasonably 
insisted, that no society can grow indefinitely.8 But that also—ironically—is the essence of 
capitalism. For capitalism is cyclical. It is ambidextrous. It supposes that what grows shrinks. But 
also that shrinkage presages growth. What is interesting about capitalism is not growth or 
shrinkage but the super-position of the two. Shrinkage is the limit of growth that is also the 
precursor of growth. 
      One can read the Weberian Protestant ethic in these terms, but it is not necessary to 
do so. Unsurprisingly when Weber and Schumpeter met, they argued.9 Presumably this was 
partly a function of ego. But equally it was a function of world view.  As Castoriadis understood, 
and here his insight really shines and far exceeds the usual left-wing mumble, the Weberian 
Protestant ethic represents not just the driver of capitalism or its productive limit; it is also (in 
one late-appearing version) a negation of capitalism and creation. It is easy to understand, in no 
small measure thanks to Max Weber, how the relatively austere nature of Protestantism 
explains the mountainous riches of modern capitalism, especially when the Protestant ethic 
was translated and refigured in the American context. Even if the Renaissance invented double-
entry book-keeping, Protestant religious budgeting amplified and elucidated capitalist 
economic budgeting. It subtly encouraged individuals and companies to do more with less. 
Christianity is a religion of paradox.10 The paradox of religious budgeting lent the modern 
economic concept of productivity its essence and its power. Productivity is a function of the 
paradox that less is more. It is an exceptionally potent driver of modern economies. At the 




What is today’s innovation is tomorrow’s norm. So that the ‘less’ that produces ‘more’ 
(eventually) produces ‘less’. And so the cycle goes, on and on. But significantly, as Castoriadis 
observed in writings in the 1950s and 1960s, rationalization also produces another non-
productive kind of capitalism—bureaucratic capitalism—that far from driving the cycle of 
growth-shrinkage-growth leads to a slow asphyxiation and self-cannibalization of capitalism as 
a productive system and the emergence of multiple parasitic classes and parasitic offices and 
processes within modern societies.11  
Before examining the phenomenon of bureaucratic capitalism more closely, some 
political context is important. I noted previously that Castoriadis began political life as a 
Trotskyist. This is not just a curiosity. There was a generation or two of twentieth-century 
thinkers who, like Castoriadis, at the start of their political lives had brief spells as Trotsykists 
and then moved on—many of them to become standard-bearers of the intellectual and political 
right. A good portion of the first generation of American neo-conservatives falls into this 
category.12 Why is this important? Trotsky was one of an endless stream of tyrannical and 
authoritarian figures that Russian politics produced—and has continued to produce to this day. 
The thing that made him odd though was not that he was purged by Stalin but that he lived 
long enough to create a critique of Stalin that had one interesting characteristic. It charged that 
Stalin ruined the Russian Revolution by creating a parasitic bureaucratic caste personified by 
the dictator. Most who passed quickly through Trotskyism grasped that Trotsky had the same 
tyrannical traits as Stalin and realized the Russian Revolution was a tyranny from day one. 
However they saw some validity in the theory of the parasitic bureaucratic caste. This theory 
helped explain the Soviet-era nomenclatura. Some Trotskyists suggested that communist 
bureaucracies would eventually acquire capitalist traits. This went a long way to explaining the 
survival of the Communist Party in China, which managed to successfully transition China from 
a totalitarian command economy in the direction of authoritarian bureaucratic capitalism. 
Trotskyist intuitions about bureaucratic parasites were also helpful in explaining some of the 
less-than-healthy characteristics developing in capitalist societies in the twentieth-century 
West. This was underlined by James Burnham in his 1941 book The Managerial Revolution. 




paleo-conservative.13 The essence of his view was that managers were becoming a new ruling 
class. This extrapolated from what Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means had observed in their 1932 
study The Modern Corporation and Private Property, namely that the ownership and the control 
of companies were separating. What Berle and Means, and later Burnham, observed was 
arguably the consequence of the procedural rationality, the processes of rationalization that 
Weber observed in the early twentieth century. In this moment, the methodical nature of the 
Protestant ethic was producing not paradox but a kind of suffocating step-by-step process that 
everyone would soon start to recognize as bureaucratization. As bureaucracy spread in modern 
organizations, control was substituted for command. Rule was replaced by rules; obedience by 
compliance; direction by method; and initiative by system. This was the source of the 
ubiquitous world of paper work, a world in which information could become a technology, a 
system and a science. In this world, form was replaced by paperwork forms.     
Burnham astutely figured out that the supposedly impersonal procedures of managers 
represented a very personal claim on power.14 They wanted to rule in place of others while 
claiming they were doing no such thing. They used rules to rule. The Burnham thesis in turn 
influenced the neo-conservative theory of the new class in the 1960s.15 Neo-conservative 
writers in that era observed the rapid expansion of a new imperious class of the tertiary-
educated that—streaming out of universities, their heads filled with all sorts of social 
ideology—began capturing the state, enlarging it, and driving the expansion of unsustainable 
entitlement programs and all manner of bureaucratic law. They too wished to rule by rules. 
They proceeded forthwith to make up the rules that others were supposed to live by. This was a 
project of the political left not of the political right. In the mind of the left, procedural rules 
equaled the state equaled the public good. The rest was capitalism which was the public bad. 
Castoriadis never wavered from a nominal identification with the political left. He espoused all 
the requisite conventional ritual-sounding criticisms of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
in the 1980s.16 Yet for all that he was still an unorthodox type of character. He was savage in his 
criticism of Soviet tyranny and unstinting in his repudiation of leftists, and that meant most of 
them, who defended the Soviet Union explicitly or implicitly right until the day it died. 




capitalism. From the late forties to the mid sixties he was a member of the French intellectual 
group Socialism or Barbarism. This group was persistently critical of the bureaucratization of 
modern society and it argued at length for a self-managed society that was not reliant on 
behemoth bureaucracies. Castoriadis had a distinctive frame of mind.  
So what—in Castoriadis’ view—made bureaucratic capitalism a delinquent 
phenomenon? Much of his critique reads and feels like standard left-wing discourse of the 
time; much of this discourse would become the platitudes of the nineteen seventies. Yet at the 
same there is something else in Castoriadis’ work, something that transcends the clichés of the 
time. Both the standard and the non-standard critiques of bureaucratic capitalism are 
interwoven in his 1960 Socialism or Barbarism study ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’.17 At 
that point in time, he observed that bureaucracy had become the logic of contemporary 
society, its response to everything.18 He saw bureaucratization in a fairly conventional sense—
as the management of activity by hierarchical apparatuses. These had become omnipresent—in 
production, in the state, in consumption, leisure and scientific research. He offered the left-
wing cliché that bureaucracies manipulate human beings: the apparatuses of sales, advertising, 
and market research manipulate human needs and that, through the bureaucratization of press 
and radio and the universities, culture and science had become similarly organized.19 He alludes 
(first) to the Berle and Means’ theory that owners had been replaced by managers and (second) 
to the syndicalist theory that bureaucratization had separated the direction of production from 
its execution.20 What follows from the latter is instrumentalisation. Human beings become a 
means to the end of production.21 Workers are reduced to the position of tool-like executants. 
This is Marx’s theory of alienated labor read through Kantian philosophical categories. Again it 
was standard fare by the nineteen seventies, and hardly conceptually original in the nineteen 
fifties. What followed from this, in the eyes of Castoriadis and many others, was the idea that 
workers who were reduced to taking orders and denied intrinsic satisfaction at work found 
alternate satisfaction in income and promotion and status distinctions. In the nineteen sixties, a 





And so did Castoriadis. Yet he also said something different. He offered a view that 
suggested that bureaucratization was also something other than Kantian-Marxian alienation. It 
was actually a loss of meaning. Bureaucratization is more than simply the generation of 
hierarchical apparatuses, or the separation of direction and execution, or the cleavage of 
ownership and direction, or the turning human beings and their needs into instruments. In fact, 
truth told, all of those things came before what twentieth-century commentators began to call 
the bureaucratization of the world. Bureaucratization may or may not be connected with those 
things that so rattled the cage of the nineteen sixties. But it is also distinct from them. It stands 
apart from them. For bureaucratization at its core is an inversion of meaning. If all societies 
require the production of meaning, then bureaucratization can be best understood as the 
production of nonsense. There are various ways of producing nonsense. Hierarchies, alienation, 
and instrumentalisation are all capable (to a degree) of producing nonsense. But neither do 
they or their effects explain the pervasive way in which all aspects of society became subject in 
the twentieth century to bureaucratic logic, or more precisely to bureaucratic illogic.  
The pseudo-logic of the bureaucratic society is tantamount to the emptying out of 
meaning. It produces vacuity. It is a kind of logic or reason that, as it unfolds, becomes illogical 
and unreasonable. If logic or reason is supposed to explain something, then bureaucratic logic 
makes things, while logical, inexplicable. An explanation is one of the key things by which 
human beings create meaning. If something does not make sense, then a basic response of all 
human beings is to ask for an explanation. In a bureaucratized society or institution, you will get 
an explanation—however the explanation will not make sense. Those who offer the 
explanation, often members of an apparatus, speak as if an explanation is forthcoming from 
them and yet manage to say nothing at all or else not anything that other human beings regard 
as intrinsically meaningful. Twentieth-century societies developed a rich language to describe 
this impoverished manner of speaking. They learnt to call it spin, verbiage, waffle, 
gobbledygook, flimflam, guff, blather, drivel, and so on. They learnt to recognize that most 
people in offices, not least those in high offices, spoke this language. They found that some 




rule. The tradition of plain-speaking, directness and forthrightness progressively disappeared as 
the world became bureaucratized.22  
Bureaucratic language tells us a lot about bureaucratic modernity. It suggests that 
bureaucratization is more than a function of rationalization, even if in part it is also that. It is 
clear that rationalization does generate bureaucratization. As procedural rationality spread 
through the course of the twentieth century, the response of organizational actors to problems 
changed. Rather than fix a problem directly, they opted for the indirect approach. They began 
to prefer to create a new procedure when-ever a new problem occurred. Procedural rationality 
pointed human beings away from the personal to the impersonal. No longer did anyone stuff 
up. Instead any fault and any correction of a fault was the result of rules, methods, and 
procedures. This had a crushing effect on individual responsibility and on the substantive 
outcomes of organized human action. Organizations henceforth thought of improvement as 
procedural change. Every act of problem-solving generated new procedures. The shift from 
‘ownership’ to ‘management’ was a symptom of the dominance of procedural rationality. Its 
rise generated additional offices and multiplied functions. The creation, transmission and 
implementation of procedures required endless additional staff, resources and time. The 
resulting bureaus swamped organizations and the larger society with a tsunami of rules, 
handbooks, processes, plans, steps, guidelines, and policies. These were universally written in 
an awkward language that was pseudo-juridical and empty.   
Resources were re-allocated to rule generation and compliance. As the mid-20th century 
fascination with ‘planning’ was to show, outcomes were sacrificed to processes. Castoriadis was 
right to dub procedural rationality as a kind of pseudo-rational mastery. It constantly assures 
organizations that they are doing something when they are not. Procedures encourage the 
simulation of action. If one has a plan, then one can claim to have done something. Procedural 
rationality elicits ersatz, pretend, fake and mock action. As bureaucracy spreads, more and 
more people devote their working lives to producing, auditing, and reporting on fake action. 
Massive documents and weighty folders are testament to the endless plans of action that are 
never realized. These are matched by the suffocating reality of multitudinous procedures that 




fictitious analytic chunks designed to be governed by rules. Every step in these procedures is 
accompanied by forms, assessments, approvals, and reviews. Each of these demands resources, 
staff, and time.  
Industrial modernity and its passion for productive innovation unleashed a huge 
quantum of uncertainty. Contingency was its child. Procedure, method and analysis promised 
that contingency could be mastered. But it couldn’t be. Such mastery is illusionary. No amount 
of procedural specification can eliminate the unknown and the uncertain. So in every 
department of modern life unexpected problems appear. Bad contingencies arise. Accidents 
happen. Follies abound, unabated by rules. However it is not only the illusion of procedural 
rationality that inspires bureaucracy. Procedural reason supposes that problems can be solved 
or forestalled by methodical rules. This though assumes that problems in themselves are 
unproblematic. That is not the case. For the greatest source of bureaucratization in the last 
century has been the vast effort to rationalize non-problems. Procedural reason supposes that 
dangerous behaviors can be obviated prospectively or retrospectively by good procedures. That 
supposes in turn that it is a straightforward matter to identify problem behaviors. It is not. In 
fact, the trend of the last century has been to identify an endless array of non-problems as 
problems, and then to devise methods, rules, processes, offices, functions, and agencies to deal 
with them. This happens in a way that seems remarkably easy. A few very vocal people sound 
off about a non-problem. That attracts an audience. The audience evolves into a lobby. The 
lobby gets a trial measure to deal with the non-problem. The measure devolves into 
regulations, rules, taxes, norms, policies, and plans. Offices, departments, bureaus, branches, 
units, and working groups are set up to promulgate and administer these. Reviews, reports, 
audits, inspections, checks, and assessments follow.  
The greatest time and attention in a bureaucratic committee is always given over to the 
least important topic of discussion. Such committees will spend much more time discussing the 
name of a new building than they will in devising measures to deal with a devastating budget 
deficit engulfing their institution. Likewise in the choice of problems, a bureaucratic society 
devotes most of its attention not to serious problems but to specious non-problems. It 




carbon dioxide into the atmosphere or the use of fossil fuels in automobiles. War and 
depression seem inconsequential in comparison. Of course the drive of bureaucratic societies is 
to make non-problems seem super-consequential. That is their curious nature. In these 
societies non-problems come to possess fake significance. They emit bogus urgency. They 
generate mock meaning. They give rise to faux crises and ersatz outpourings of human 
emotion. While they may be all sound and fury signifying nothing, nonetheless accompanying 
them always is a flood of fatuous language that implores human beings to take the non-
problem seriously. Evidence is marshaled, polemics deployed, and arguments unleashed. The 
more bogus a problem, the greater is the weight of sententious opinion. That is why 
bureaucratic societies, though they are very procedural and are filled with empty methodical 
language games, are also aggressively moralizing. Moralizers aim barrages of ‘oughts, shoulds 
and musts’ at those who refuse to believe in the spurious weightiness of non-problems and 
who refuse to spend their time dignifying ridiculous topics with gravitas. The function of the 
moralizer is to ‘prove’ that what is silly is important. Thus we get from institutions in 
bureaucratic societies an onslaught of self-important language. It is engorged with a sense of its 
own significance yet conveys at the same time a distinct sense of its own absurdity and 
emptiness. It is barren, it is bare, and it is blank while it thinks of itself in the very opposite 
terms.                                  
 Castoriadis’ gift was to give a name to the larger syndrome that generates an endless 
stream of prattle, claptrap and blather from social institutions. He pointed to a kind of 
capitalism that did not just produce hierarchy, alienation or instrumentalisation but that 
produced meaninglessness. Its agents said things, and did things, and undertook things that 
were hollow. Its endeavors, if looked at closely, were pointless. Castoriadis often fell back on 
older explanations of what was going on. He would talk about the body of managers who 
prepared or directed the work of others in the production process.23 But Kant and Marx did not 
really illuminate this new phase of capitalism. For what distinguished bureaucratic capitalism 
was that it systematically destroyed the significance of social activities; and following that it 
destroyed people’s responsibility and initiative.24 This was not the function of alienation or 




capitalism and the bureaucratization of the world generated insignificance. As it sucked the 
significance from activities in all domains of life, it caused human beings to disengage from life 
and substitute for that feckless irresponsibility. 
As a consequence of bureaucratization, all kinds of human activities—from work to 
politics—stop being signifying activities. They stop being productive of meaning. Castoriadis 
explained this is in quasi-Hegelian-cum-Romantic terms.25 Accordingly meaning is a whole. 
Social systems that destroy meaning fragment things. They separate activities and things into 
parts without recomposing them. Castoriadis, again not quite being able to follow the 
implications of his own insight, thought of this carve up at work as being a variation of Adam 
Smith’s division of labor. Labor is fragmented on the shop floor and only those who work in the 
office can give it meaning. But the bureaus that metastasized everywhere in twentieth-century 
society could not synthesize what had been set asunder.26 Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right echoes in Castoriadis’ work at this point. And beneath that, the over-tones of the 
Romantics are to be heard. But if we forget about Smith, Hegel and Marx, the basic point still 
stands. Bureaucratic society cannot synthesize and cannot therefore generate meaning. 
Castoriadis doubted therefore that it could ensure its own cohesion.27 The question, though, is 
why not? At several points Castoriadis offers a traditionalist account of its failure. At several 
crucial junctures through his career he did the same. He says that two centuries of capitalism 
had resulted in the collapse of the traditional system of values (religion and the family). 
Castoriadis actively disliked religion but regularly defended the family. He appealed to 
community and solidarity, classic Romantic tropes, against fragmentation.28 And he thought 
that the attempt to substitute ‘rational’ modern values in their place was pathetic. All that one 
got from that were streams of platitudes from political racketeers, which is certainly true.  
In short, tradition fails in modernity but modern values are laughable. Writing in 1960, 
Castoriadis excoriates the vacuous chatter about ‘the new “lay and republican’ morality in 
France’ spun by the Radical Socialist party. Nothing changes—think today of the spine-tingling 
de-industrializing piffle proffered by the Greens parties or the juvenile inanity of the British 
Liberal Party to get a sense of the ridiculous nature of this vacuous values talk. Castoriadis 




poppycock, people disengage from politics. Political parties were once mass organizations with 
huge memberships. Castoriadis observes, already in the late 1950s, how people were exiting 
from these parties in droves, and from the trade unions, even though by comparison with today 
these organizations were still huge relative to the population.29 The former party and union 
members decamped into private life. Why? Because they saw that participation was 
meaningless. It obliged participants to agree with patently untrue or absurd statements. An 
alternate explanation of the cause of this disengagement was that it was an effect of hierarchy. 
In his 1911 book on Political Parties, the German sociologist Robert Michels observed what he 
called the iron law of oligarchy of the party. The party bosses ruled. Yet in 1911, by comparison 
with our own time, those parties still had massive memberships. Perhaps it is true that over the 
next century the oligarchs alienated the demos. But then that begs the question: how and why 
did that happen? True, party bosses over-ride popular sentiment in political parties of all 
persuasions. But then that is politics and the bosses in their own turn are routinely over-ridden 
by legislators and presidents and prime ministers. Oligarchs and hierarchs have been around a 
very long time and frequently have had mass followings. So why were the oligarchs unable to 
retain large memberships in parties and trade unions in the twentieth century? Perhaps this has 
to do with the fact that bureaucratization is not simply a synonym for hierarchy and it does not 
simply work through alienation or instrumentalisation. Its effects are much more direct and its 
causes are much more specific. 
Bureaucratization is the production of meaninglessness. A trade union exists to defend 
the most vulnerable and the least advantaged of its members. It substitutes the power of 
association and combination for the power of skill or capital. Yet as time passed by, trade 
unions came increasingly to defend not the most vulnerable and least advantaged but rather 
the most dysfunctional and least able. Those who most suffered were other union members 
who had to undertake the work of the lazy and the inept. The hard working and the competent 
found that the labor market better recognized their skills and wasted their time less than their 
union representatives who told fairy tales about capacity, competence, reward and 
opportunity. A credibility gap opened up between rhetoric and reality. The nature of 




question them. Union members found that puncturing holes in ridiculous official tales (like the 
tales of class struggle) only caused them to be ticked off. So rather than be chastised for not 
believing the nonsense they were served up, they simply gave up their membership in the 
leagues of twaddle. Those who remained were either those who believed the credulous fairy 
tales or those who most benefited from them. Bureaucratization is successful not because so 
many people spontaneously believe the quack mythology that it sprouts (though some do) but 
rather because it generates material interests (offices, apparatuses and incomes) that make the 
beneficiaries of those interests choose to believe the unbelievable.            
An example might help explain this. In 1935 the New York Times introduced to the world 
the term ‘boondoggle’. The Times reported that the Franklin Roosevelt’s administration had 
spent $3 million on recreation activities for the unemployed including the making of craft 
oddments like ‘boon doggles’. The term stuck. It describes waste-of-money projects. 
Bureaucratic societies, and the bureaucratic form of capitalism, are an endless producer of 
boondoggles. Roosevelt’s New Deal, which managed to prolong the Great Depression in the 
United States for many more years than in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, did so by 
inventing boondoggle capitalism, otherwise known as state capitalism or bureaucratic 
capitalism. From 1931 to the present, this delinquent form of capitalism has flourished. It has 
done so by attaching itself to the empty but persuasive signifiers of a bureaucratic society. 
These are signifiers that are filled with ersatz meaning. ‘Folk art’ and ‘craft activity’ are 
examples. These are typical of the kind of inverse signifiers that are popular in a bureaucratic 
society. Industrialism inspires anti-industrial signifiers; sophisticated urbanism recoils with folk 
and indigenous symbols. None of these symbols mean anything. They are dislocated from any 
society in which they might have a meaning. They have no functional or substantive role in a 
modern society. Indeed most of them are complete fictions. They are tokens of a romantic 
authenticity that is manufactured in high modern urban locations.  
Spending programs readily attach themselves to symbols of this type. Partly this is so 
because there is a big audience for them. Because they are empty, they are free floating and 
they are easily adapted to all kinds of rhetorical purposes. They come in very handy when policy 




been replaced by procedural rationality. Ends were replaced with rules. But this is not quite 
true. In a lot of cases in fact the rationality of ends was replaced by the rationality of spurious 
ends. Romantic symbols (folk, green, people, community, earth symbols) provide servings of 
pseudo-meaning in an industrial, urban, machine world. But they are not the only source of 
fake meaning. Anti-romantic symbols can be just as usefully deployed to that end. A classic one 
is ‘national security’. In 2010 the US Army in Afghanistan spent $119 million annually to lease 
3,000 cars at around $40,000 a year per car. The General Services Administration concluded 
that the military could have leased and maintained the same number of vehicles for about $60 
million a year, half the cost.30 It is not that economic welfare or military contracting are unreal 
in themselves (quite the contrary). Nevertheless, accreted layers of fakeness manage to attach 
to their body. False, faux, make-believe and sham meaning readily projects itself onto 
substantive meaning in bureaucratic modernity. Almost every modern ‘ism’ is filled to brim with 
insignificancy. It is as though the twentieth century willed itself to satisfy its meaning needs 
with counterfeit meaning of all kinds. The most fake of all of the ideologies were the 
authenticity ideologies. Almost anything that is promoted as genuine (genuinely national, 
natural, popular) is a sham. When Presidents start talking about ‘the folks’, beware. The high-
tech money-lenders and bundlers are standing adjacent, off-stage. If patriotism was the last 
refuge of the scoundrel in Samuel Johnson’s time, then in our own time authenticity is the last 
refuge of ultra-modern ultra-liberal elites as they squeeze persuasive insignificance from the 
rock of meaning. One knows that this is something that cannot continue indefinitely.       
The capitalism that these elites have created—bureaucratic capitalism—is a capitalism 
of feint, affectation, simulation, and put on. It flourishes in a world of fauxitalism in which the 
state grants enterprises large amount of money to satisfy popular excitement about one or 
other empty signifier that the larger society (for a time) fawns over. The case of the Obama-era 
scandal of Solyndra the Californian solar cell manufacturer that in 2009 took a $535 million loan 
guarantee from the US federal government and then filed for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy in 
2011 is typical and hardly exceptional. In the 1980s, the US Federal Government provided $147 
million of taxpayers’ money to the ‘Solar One’ solar energy plant in California, $1.5 billion in 




constructed by Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi’s company Triad America.31 All of these 
schemes went bust. Biofuels, clean energy, and green energy are classic empty signifiers. Each 
of them promise the impossible: to match the economy and volume of fossil fuels.    
In the last eighty years, we have seen the rise and rise and rise of junk: junk culture, junk 
science, junk business, and junk everything. Much of this has come with the imprimatur of the 
state. Many of the junk schemes have their source and more especially their funding in the 
state. The grant and the subsidy have become powerful mediums for producing junk. The art of 
those who apply for the grant and those who give the grant is to generate plausible 
meaninglessness. This is meaninglessness that appears to have a meaning. ‘We will produce 
energy sufficient to power a modern society from wind or solar sources.’ That is a statement 
that at first glance seems to have a meaning. It connects with the human impulse not to foul 
the natural environment. Yet all ‘clean’ energy sources are uneconomic. They cost much more 
than energy from fossil fuels. These are industries that can only exist if they subsidized. This is a 
perfect example of bureaucratic capitalism. It only exists through transfer payments from 
taxpayers. It is a corporate welfare economy. A bureaucratic society produces endless examples 
of boondoggles. It does this because its inner essence is to produce nothing. The easiest way of 
producing nothing, though by no means the only way, is for government to subsidize the 
production of nothing. Now a grant-getter cannot literally say to government that the intention 
is to produce nothing. Rather what is invariably stated is that what will be produced is of deep, 
unfathomable and profound importance to society. Its good is incalculable. Its potential benefit 
is stupendous. If the project is not subsidized then terrible harm will follow. If the unemployed 
workers do not get their boondoggle folk-art training then they will suffer from alcoholism, 
suicide, family break up, and martial stress. Their children will despise them and their parents 
will spurn them. The bunkum works for a while, and sometimes for a long time. But eventually 
it stops working and the schemes, subsidies and grants are finally closed down, and forever 
after nobody talks about the great promise that somehow has mysteriously evaporated.                      
The number and scale of boondoggles today suggests that bureaucratic capitalism is 
more popular now than when Castoriadis was writing in 1960. The alienation model which 




they retreat into private life and consume.32 They compensate for lack of meaning with social 
irresponsibility.33 They indulge in irrationality. They produce waste. Work becomes a source of 
income or security or opportunity for promotion but not a source of intrinsic meaning. In 
Weber’s terms, the work ethic declines. The stupid ethic rises. With irresponsibility comes 
indifference. With indifference comes a lack of initiative. Nothing matters, and what if it did? 
There is some truth in all of this. Yet boondoggle capitalism has had a very long life because one 
of the paradoxes of the epoch of the bureaucratic society is that people—to a point—love the 
meaninglessness that it generates. Specious meaning can be at times quite popular—even if it 
is routinely followed by buyers’ regret. Bureaucracy has spread everywhere into almost every 
crack and crevice of social life. People despise it, but they also love it—to a point.  
How can one love the state of meaninglessness? How can it be that a society that 
requires, like all societies, a core of meaning is able to live off the endless production of 
nonsense? Well it can—but it cannot do so forever. For the simulation of meaning has a short 
shelf life. Simulation of meaning is to life as kitsch is to art. Kitsch has the superficial 
appearance of art, but it is not art. Bureaucratic language appears to convey meaning, but in 
reality it does not. If the human imagination rests on the power of analogy, then simulation is 
the production of false analogies. Bureaucracy produces the likeness or simulation of services, 
products, and knowledge. Yet when looked at closely, the likeness fades to nothing. 
Bureaucracy says that it is doing something but in fact it does nothing of substance. The 
imagination looks at a tree and sees a house. Bureaucracy says it is providing housing and 
produces a likeness of that in the guise of a paper trail of approvals, compliance procedures, 
and risk assessments whose medium is a non-language. This non-language does not represent 
the production of a house, one of the anchors of a meaningful human existence. Rather it 
represents the production of non-sense in the guise of a method without substance and 
process indifferent to outcome. The house is the almost accidental by-product of check, 
appraisal, approval, sanction, and rule. People disapprove of this. They are irritated by the 
delays, the form-filling, the reviews and the compliance steps. But they also approve of it, for 
they love the fake meaning that these processes invoke. They loved the ‘planned society’ in the 




of these pseudo-societies came to anything but bureaucracy is the point. Socialism and 
environmentalism are systems of fake meaning. That Castoriadis rather liked environmentalism 
is beside the point.34 He was right to grasp that modern bureaucracy is the production of 
meaninglessness. That it manages to create fake meaning by apparent authentic meanings is 
the cunning of its reason, no more. We all get sucked in one way or another. The enduring 
question left from this is whether societies can perpetually live off fake meaning if society relies 
on the production of substantial meaning. It is doubtful. If so, then what is the future of 
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1
  Deidre McCloskey in Bourgeois Dignity (2010) proposes that around 1700 a decisive shift occurred in the 
north-western Europe in favor of innovation, setting in train a history of scientific, technical, mercantile and finally 
(and decisively) industrial discovery and application that permanently changed the nature of economics.      
2
  ‘The only cases where we could speak genuinely of “disorder” are, I think, those of “old systems that are 
in crisis” or “crumbling”. So, for instance, with the late Roman World—or many Third World societies today. In the 
first case, a new “unifying principle”, a new magma of social imaginary significations, eventually emerged with 
Christianity… In the second case, that of Third World countries, no new “unifying principle” seems to emerge…’     
See Castoriadis, ‘The Imaginary: Creation in the Social-Historical Domain’ [1981], World in Fragments (1997), p. 16. 
3  ‘The crisis of the family today does not consist only, and not so much, in its statistical fragility. What is at 
issue is the crumbling and disintegration of the traditional roles—man, woman, parents, children—and the 
consequences thereof: the formless disorientation of new generations.’ Yes, agreed Castoriadis, there were 
moments of legitimate emancipation in the undoing of traditional roles. ‘But the ambiguities of its effects have 
long been noted. The more time passes, the more one is justified in asking oneself whether this process is 
expressed more by a blossoming forth of new ways of living than by sheer disorientation and anomie.’ See ‘The 
Crisis of Western Societies’ [1982], The Castoriadis Reader (1997), p. 259.     
4  ‘No doubt, heteronomous societies have created immortal works—or, quite simply, a countless host of 
beautiful objects. And already, this statement shows—from a democratic perspective, as a matter of fact—the 
untenability of the historical proscriptions today’s new fanatics want to issue concerning cultural matters. 
Following the logic of certain feminists, for example, I ought to cast out the Passion According to Saint John not 
only because it was composed by a dead and white male but because it gives expression to a religious faith that, in 
my own view, is alienating.’ See ‘Culture in a Democratic Society’ [1994] in The Castoriadis Reader (1997), p. 341. 
5  Joseph Schumpeter, Business Cycles (1939).  
6  Castoriadis, ‘Reflections on “Rationality” and “Development”’ [1976], Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy 
(1991), p. 185. 
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 Which led the conservative Castoriadis to comment: ‘Let us put aside that which is perhaps the most 
important aspect of the pill, the psychical aspect, of which nobody talks: What might happen to human beings 
should they begin to see themselves as absolute masters over the decision to bequeath or not bequeath life, 
without having to pay a thing for this “power” (beyond two dollars a month).’ And now not even two dollars a 
month: the 2012 US Democratic Party and its marquee fool, Sandra Fluke, demanded that employers with religious 
affiliations offer health insurance plans that provide free birth control. A graduate of Cornell gender studies and 
Georgetown law, Fluke’s views are a clear sign of an asinine political elite that not only retails frivolities as policy—
and would therefore like to exclude reasonable conscience-exceptions out of some kind of over-wrought kitsch 
moralizing absolutism—but that can no longer grasp the larger implications of what its foot-stamping demands. 
Fluke is a classic political ladder-climber in a bureaucratic society. By the age of 31, she had co-founded the New 
York Statewide Coalition for Fair Access to Family Court, was a member of the Manhattan Borough President’s 
Taskforce on Domestic Violence and multiple other New York City and New York State coalitions, the recipient of a 
Women Lawyers of Los Angeles’ Fran Kandel Public Interest Grant, and had served as president of the Georgetown 
Law Students for Reproductive Justice. Bureaucratic societies dress up such political careerism in the garb of the 
needy, the vulnerable and the afflicted. This is done in a manner that is both cynical and naive at the same time. 
The presumed public good of such careers is in reality just one long tedious addition to the curriculum vitae—itself 
an ever-evolving, ever-expanding tool of self-promotion in bureaucratic societies. In these societies, and in 
loathsome ways, activism readily turns into a career and such careers, reliant as they invariably are on the public 
purse, are no more and no less a vehicle for redistributing money from the poor to the gilded ultra-affluent upper 
middle classes for whom anything like real work is an offense against their humanity. See Castoriadis, ‘Reflections 
on “Rationality” and “Development”’, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy (1991), p. 194   
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10  This was brilliantly and repeatedly argued by G.K. Chesterton, one of the greatest thinkers of the 
twentieth century. On the paradoxical foundation of Christianity, see for example Chesterton, The Everlasting Man 
(2007 [1925]).  
11  Castoriadis, ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’ [1960-1961] in Political and Social Writings Volume 2 
(1988), p. 271. 
12  Many neo-conservative intellectuals began life as American Trotskyists. These figures had taken seriously 
the Trotskyist opposition to the entropic Soviet Union, so much so that by the 1970s and 1980s they were 
embracing the idea of a strong American military capable of defeating the Soviets. They subsequently applied 
similar notions to reversing the entropic slide of states in the Middle East. One of the initial points of intersection 
and crystallisation of these forces was the Trotskyist organizer Max Schachtman. His first step on a path that would 
take many intellectuals from American Trotskyism to neo-conservatism was to leave the Socialist Workers Party in 
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Social Democracy. Other key figures included Schachtman-ally James Burnham, Burnham’s friend the philosopher 
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Senator Henry Jackson (such as Elliot Abrams), and so on. Kirkpatrick, the Reagan-era Ambassador to the United 
Nations, was a member of the Schachtmanite Young People’s Socialist League and later joined Schachtman’s Social 
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